Similar to other wavelet-based image processing algorithms, the choice of wavelet filters generally affects the performance of a wavelet-based watermarking system. In this Letter, we evaluate a set of biorthogonal integer wavelets under a multiresolution-watermarking framework. Further investigation is conducted to justify the robustness performance against attacks.
Introduction:
The discrete wavelet transform (DWT) has become the core technique for image processing. Since there are numerous eligible DWT basis functions, it is of fundamental importance to know the best basis for use. This problem is almost solved for image compression. Both theoretical derivations and experimental evaluations have been conducted [1] , [2] . The 'best' wavelets (9/7 and 5/3) have been chosen for the new JPEG-2000 coding standard [3] . The same issue, however, has not been addressed for image watermarking.
A wavelet filter is expected to satisfy some of the desired properties, including timefrequency localization, regularity, large coding gain, and orthogonality [2] , [4] . In addition, the linear-phase (symmetry) constraint is often imposed in practice to avoid coefficient expansion. However, the above requirements may be conflicting. For example, the only real-valued orthogonal linear-phase wavelet with compact support is the trivial Haar filter. By relaxing the orthogonality constraint, most image applications employ linear-phase biorthogonal wavelets. This subclass of wavelets permits perfect reconstruction by symmetric extension across boundaries. Furthermore, it can be efficiently implemented in the lifting structure [5] . This letter tries to answer the 'bestbasis' question for multiresolution image watermarking systems using biorthogonal wavelets. We consider the seven biorthogonal integer wavelet transforms tabulated in reference [2] , namely 5/3, 5/11-A, 5/11-C, 9/7-M, 9/7-F, 13/7-C and 13/7-T, for performance evaluation.
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Evaluation platform:
We follow the multiresolution-watermarking framework reported in [6] to evaluate the various kernels. A q-level two-dimensional pyramidal DWT is performed to generate (3q + 1) subbands (q = 5 in the experiment). We index these subbands from 0 to 3q in a parent-to-child order. Subband 0 is an approximation to the original image while the other subbands provide details at various scales. Note that the scaling function (i.e., the analysis lowpass filter) {h(n)} for all the wavelets under study is normalized by [4] 2
We have found that this weighting usually gives near-optimal performance for coding and watermarking. A watermark signal w = {w k , k = 0, 1, … , m-1}, collected from an independent identically distributed Gaussian random source of zero mean and unit variance, is cast upon m selected wavelet coefficients. A wavelet coefficient x k is modulated by w k as
The positive parameter α in (2) is referred to as the strength factor. The location key p = {p k , k = 0, 1, … , m-1} of the watermark-bearing coefficients should be stored along with the original wavelet coefficients x and the watermark signal w for watermark extraction.
To carry on the watermark identification, the test image takes the same multiresolution analysis as in the embedding process. An estimated watermark bit v k is retrieved from , a distorted version of y
Note that the private keys p and x are required for retrieving v. We deliberately choose the watermarking system to be the informed type in order to eliminate the interference from the host data. The similarity between the extracted pattern v and the original watermark w can be measured by the linear correlation
where <., .> denotes the inner product of two vectors. An appropriate threshold on ρ should be determined for watermark verification. When tested against the same attack, a wavelet filter with a larger value of ρ (closer to 1) implies a smaller probability of false negative and better resistance to the attack.
The examined attacks are the noise-like distortions proposed in the StirMark benchmark service [7] , including sharpening, Gaussian filtering, FMLR, 3×3 median filtering, and lossy JPEG compression with different quality factors. Two standard 512 × 512 gray-level images, 'Lena' and 'Baboon', are tested. To make fair comparisons, we adjust the strength factor so that all the watermarked images under various wavelet kernels have the same peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR). The PSNRs of the watermarked Lena and Baboon are 35.6 dB and 38.4 dB, respectively.
Experimental results and analyses:
We consider the following two scenarios in sequence to investigate the robustness performance of the seven biorthogonal DWT kernels.
Scenario 1
In the first setting, we take the basic watermarking strategy proposed in [6] . The watermark is placed on the 1000 largest (in magnitude) highpass wavelet coefficients (m = 1000). Subband 0 is exempt from modification to avoid visible artifacts. The robustness performance is given in Table 1 . The 9/7-F filter (integer version of the popular spline variant given in [1] ) provides distinguishably the best results. On the other hand, the difference among the other wavelets is small. In addition to the intrinsic properties of wavelets, the robustness of an inserted watermark is largely determined by its spectral location. A good watermark should reside in perceptually most significant spectral components to better withstand attacks [8] . In Scenario 1, less resilient wavelet coefficients may be selected due to non-orthogonality of the biorthogonal filters. Orthogonality implies energy preservation. For biorthogonal wavelets, one would expect "energy mismatch" for wavelet coefficients at different scales. Several closeness measures on orthogonality have been discussed. For example, the near-orthogonality measure (NOM) has been defined for biorthogonal wavelets as [9] , [10] 
Orthogonal wavelets have the NOM value equal to 1. The deviation of NOM from 1 can be regarded as the lowpass subband distortion introduced by non-orthogonality. The NOM values of the seven filters under study are computed and listed in Table 2 . It can be seen that the 9/7-F wavelet is 'almost' orthogonal; it is of no surprise since its parent linear wavelet is designed to approximate an orthonormal filter [1] . The other filters would thus suffer more from the inherent energy mismatch.
Scenario 2
To avoid the described energy mismatch, we modify the basic scheme in Scenario 1 by labeling only subbands of the same scale. The new scenario selects the 256 largest (in magnitude) wavelet coefficients out of the 512 coefficients within subbands 1 and 2. The corresponding robustness performance is given in Table 3 . It is noted that the 9/7-F filter turns out to be much less prominent in this case. In fact two other wavelets, 13/7-C and 13/7-T, yield comparable results with the 9/7-F. This confirms our conjecture that energy mismatch is the most important factor that affects the watermarking robustness of biorthogonal wavelets. Since the examined attacks can be approximately modeled as short-term jamming, filters with longer duration will have a better chance to prevail.
Besides, we have tested the floating-point versions of the employed filter banks, and we have observed only small differences incurred by the integer approximation.
Conclusion:
This paper evaluates the robustness performance of biorthogonal wavelets under a spread-spectrum watermarking framework. The widely adopted 9/7-F wavelet provides a substantial edge in a normal watermarking condition. Further investigation shows that other biorthogonal wavelets could achieve similar performance to the 9/7-F filter by 6 taking the non-orthogonality into account.
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